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PREFACE
The Advanced EVA System Design Requirements study was a twelve
month effort to identify specific criteria regarding Space Sta-
tion EVA hardware requirements by analyses of EVA missions,
environments, operations, procedures_ and Space Station and STS
interfaces. The study began in January of 1985 and was completed
in January, 1986.
This executive summary report has been prepared in accordance
with the Statement of Work for the subject study, contract NAS9-
17299_ and summarizes the data and analyses from which all the
study results were derived. A detailed report has also been
prepared for distribution as determined by the contract monitors.
The study results are intended to provide information and guide-
lines in a form that will assist NASA program managers in evalua-
ting and substantiating EVA system requirements to support a
productive EVA capability for the Space Station Program.
Questions and comments regarding this study or the material
contained in this document should bedirected to:
Michael Rouen/EC3
EVAS Study Technical Monitor
NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058
(713) 483-6193
(or)
Thomas G. Woods
EVAS Study Manager
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company - Houston Division
16055 Space Center Blvd.
Houston_ Texas 77062
(713) 280-1649
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SECTION 1
Introduction and Study Overview
Introduction
The purpose of this document is to report on the technical work
accomplished on the Advanced Extravehicular Activity System Study,
Contract NAS-9-17299. The study was performed to define and
establish design requirements and criteria for the Space Station
Advanced Extravehicular Activity System (EVAS) including crew
enclosures, portable life support systems, maneuvering propulsion
systems, and related EVA support equipment. The study considered
EVA mission requirements, environments, and medical and physiolo-
gical requirements, as well as operational, procedures and trai-
ning issues.
1.1 Team Organization
The MDC EVAS Study Team was organized to take advantage of a
unique mix of experience and expertise _n defining and deve-
loping EVA systems, as well as in planning and conducting succes-
sful EVA operations. (Figure 1-1). The Houston Division of the
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company provided overall study
management and expert task leadership dedicated to incorporating
in this study all the relevant lessons learned while helping NASA
develop and exercise the NSTS EVA capability which has been so
spectacularly demonstrated in recent years. To this invaluable
understanding of EVA operations were added the skills and expe-
rience of the Huntington Beach division of MDAC (for physiology,
productivity, system integration and compatibility with Space
Station architecture); the Hamilton Standard Division of United
Technologies (for life support system technologies); ILC-Dover
(for crew enclosure, materials and ancillary equipment); and
Martin Marietta (for maneuvering propulsion technologies).
Corporate EVA experience bases dating back to Gemini IV were thus
applied to the purpose of defining EVA system requirements for
the Space Station.
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FIGURE 1-1
TEAM ORGANIZATION
1.2 Study Organization
The methodology chosen for this study was a classic Phase A
approach of survey_ analysis, synthesis and definition as shown
in Figure 1-2.
90
FIGURE 1-2
STUDY ORGANIZATION
The primary activity was organized into three major tasks corres-
ponding to the contract Statement o_ Work (SOW). From numerous
sources, the EVA Requirements Survey, Task 1, attempted to iden-
ti_y and quanti_y all the routine and contingency EVA mission
requirements _or assembly, servicing, mainter_ance, and repair o_
satellites and attached payloads, as well as _or the Space
Station itsel_. Using the identified mission requirements as one
o_ several inputs, EVAS Baseline Design Requirements and Criteria
- Task 2, analysed numerous environmental, physiological,
man/machine, operational and hardware considerations to identi_y
specific design requirements .or systems that would maximize
human productivity in EVA. In Task 3, Space Station EVA Require-
ments and Inter.ace Accommodations, we identified the EVAS inter-
_aces and EVA peculiar accommodations and support requirements to
be incorporated into the SS systems and architecture. The de-
tailed Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) is illustrated in Figure 1-3•
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F I G U R E  1-3 
WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE 
1.3 Key Issues and Drivers
Specific EVA system requirements and their rationale are summa-
rized in the ensuing sections of this report. There were several
issues and driving considerations developed in the course of
the study that affected more than one system and which combined
with some unique characteristics of the Space Station to effect
many of the EVA design considerations.
1.3.1 Unique Space Station Characteristics
When compared to previous programs, the Space Station crews will
be routinely on-orbit for far longer periods, and the vehicle
itself and many of its systems will be there virtually indefini-
tely. From this factor alone were derived several other key
characteristics of the Space Station.
0 ORBIT STAY TIME GREATLY INCREASED OUER PREUIOUS PROGRAMS
0 OPERATIONAL TEMPO RELATIUELY BENIGN
0 MISSION PLANNING MORE LONG TERM, LESS PRE-MISSION DETAIL
O TRAINING MORE GENERIC, MORE TASK-ORIENTED, LESS MISSION
SPECIFIC
0 ON-ORBIT TRAINING REOUIRED FOR PROFICIENCY IN CONTINGENCY/
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
0 LONG US SHORT TERM PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS AND ENUIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION REOUIREMENTS
FIGURE 1-4
UNIQUE SPACE STATION CHARACTERISTICS AFFECTING EVA
The tempo of operations will be relatively benign with regard to
meeting most mission objectives in critical time periods. For
instance, an EVA task that takes longer than anticipated can be
rescheduled for completion in the next planned EVA event. This
takes advantage of the more permanent nature of the manned presence
than that afforded by the STS and also alleviates the potentially
deleterious effect of less mission specific training available to
SS crews. Mission planning itself will be more of a long-term
nature on the ground with much less pre-mission daily detail than
is required for Shuttle. For the same reasons, and due to the
wide variety of EVA mission requirements, pre-mission training
will emphasize development of the generic EVA skills that will be
required to accomplish them. On-orbit EVA training opportunities
will also be utilized to compliment limited ground simulations
with an abundance of on the job training to achieve true profi-
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ciency. Additional on-orbit training requirements in emergency
procedures and off-nominal EVAsystems operations are required by
the length of crew cycles and by the need to maintain proficiency
in safety critical areas.
While much has been learned about adapting man to the orbital
environment, there are new, different, and perhaps unknown risks
associated with long term exposures. The statistical probability,
however small, of a hazardous event or exposure occurring to a
crewman takes on a whole new meaning when the opportunities are
significantly increased. Thus, for Space Station there is spe-
cial emphasis on such areas as bends risk, radiation exposure,
and micrometeroid protection.
1.3.2 Key EVA Design Issues
With the considerations expressed above and with the key applica-
ble lessons learned from the STS EVA experience, several issues
emerged from the many considered in the study as having pervasive
effects on EVAS design requirements (Figure 1-5).
0 EUAS MAINTAINABILITY
0 EUAS TECHNOLOGY READINESS
0 EUA LSS UOLUME US EUA TIME AUAILABLE
0 SUIT PRESSUREJCABIN PRESSURE RELATIONSHIP AND PRODUCTIUITY
EFFECTS
0 EUA CREW AUTONOMY
0 INTEGRATION OF EUA AS A PROGRAM RESOURCE
0 STANDARDIZATION OF TASK INTERFACES
FIGURE 1-5
KEY EVA DESIGN ISSUES
Maintainability is far and away the most important issue in EVAS
design and the main reason why the STS EMU will not satisfy SS
requirements.
Technoloqy Readiness and risks associated with advanced EVAS
technologies must be carefully considered in evaluating their
benefits to EVA productivity. An assessment of technology readi-
ness for the EVAS is provided in Section 4 of this report.
EVA LSS Volume vs EVA Time Available. There are several factors
combining to drive the EVAS to an overall larger volume. While
the STS constraints on volume are not expected to exist for Space
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Station, this growth could be controlled by taking advantage of
the Station's ability to provide dependent life support capability
(i.e. via umbilicals) at remote worksites.
Suit Pressure/Cabin Pressure Relationship and Productivity
Effects. Operating space suits at the pressure levels attendant
to a sea level cabin with minimum prebreathe means that unless
there is significant improvement in the glove technology the
crewman will bear the brunt of having to perform manipulative
tasks with very stiff hands. Recent tests have provided insuf-
ficient quantifiable data to back up this key feedback from our
system operations. Further development efforts must concentrate
on improving glove mobility and/or getting the suit pressure down.
EVA Crew Autonomy is an issue which was found to affect many
areas of the EVAS and the SS EVA interfaces and accommodations.
To maximize the overall productivity of the crew they need to be
provided with all the resources to operate independently from the
ground, as well as to allow the EVA crew to operate independently
from the IV crew. This issue affects EVAS design, including
reliability and maintainability aspects, the Data Management
System, the Communications System, provisioning, and training and
makes a strong case for implementation of IVA automation and EVA
robotics.
Inteqration of EVA as a Proqram Resource is no less important
than integration of other SS user services such as heat transfer,
power distribution, pointing accuracy or data handling. This
program appears well on its way to achieving this critical per-
spective and it must be maintained during the SS development.
Finally the Standardization of Task Interfaces must be promoted
to increase EVA productivity, enhance the probability of mission
success and reduce the overhead burdens associated with perform-
ing EVA. If EVA is to be relied upon for SS assembly, maintenance,
servicing, and repair and as a resource to be applied to user
needs, then properly designed work interfaces are required.
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SECTION 2
TASK 1 - MISSION REQUIREMENTS SURVEY
2.1 MISSION AND TASK DETAIL
The study was begun by establishing as much detail as possible
about the missions and tasks of the Space Station EVAS. This
effort was hindered to some extent by the paucity of reliable
information about missions which are 7 to 15 years in the future.
Design details were usually sketchy or totally non-existant and
quite often the viability of the actual mission was in doubt.
Still, enough information existed to derive mission requirements
for the Station EVAS.
Several different sources of information were consulted in the
search for requirements. For detail on payload servicing mis-
sions Langley Data Bases dated March 1984 and May 1985 were
consulted. These data bases began in 1991 and 1992, respectively,
with the implied assumption that Space Station Initial Operation-
al Capability (IOC) would occur on that initial date. While
actual IOC is still unknown, the information derived from the
Langley Data Bases should still provide reasonable estimates if
referenced to IOC rather than a specific calendar date. As many
as possible of the principal investigators or payload sponsors
listed in the data bases were questioned. From the latest,
perhaps more accurate, Langley Data Base it was determined that,
of the 324 total missions, 141 would require some sort of EVA
support. These were a mixture of domestic and foreign payloads.
All American sponsors were contacted to verify and update the
data in the data base. Generally it was found that the informa-
tion was a sponsor's "best guess" at a very early date on what
might fly.
Using the initial data on likely missions for the Space Station
EVAS, a list of generic missions was generated which it was
believed would describe the things the EVAS would be required to
do and which would, by simplifying the analyses and reducing the
data to a manageable size, give a clear picture of those EVAS
requirements. Fifteen such generic missions were identified.
(Figure 2-1) Time estimates were made for each generic mission
and these estimates were used to estimate times for each of the
missions derived either from the Langley Data Bases or other
Space Station documentation. These estimates were then summed to
arrive at estimates of EVA time required per year for customer
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support. Figure 2-1 presents the results of this process.
1. ALIGNMENT OF XMITTER/RECEIVER ELEMENTS
2. DEPLOY/RETRACT SOLAR ARRAY
3. TRUSS STRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION
4. SATELLITE SERVICE TECHNOLOGY
5. LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION
6. SMALL/MEDIUM MODULE MANIPULATION
7. LARGE MIRROR CONSTRUCTION
8. CONSUMABLES RECHARGE VIA TRANSPORT
9. ORBIT LAUNCH OPERATIONS
10. SUBSATELLITE OPERATIONS
11. SPACE STATION RADIATOR CONSTRUCTION (ORBITER SUPPORTED)
12. ORBITER SUPPORTED LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION
13. ORBITER SUPPORTED TRUSS CONSTRUCTION/DEPLOYMENT
14. RADIATOR CONSTRUCTION-FULL UP SPACE STATION
15. EVA RESCUE
FIGURE 2-1
GENERIC EVA MISSIONS
Our analyses yielded the information that a minimum of slightly
more than 1000 manhours of EVA time per year will be required at
Station IOC and that within two years approximately 4500 manhours
of EVA time will be required per year for all the missions in the
Langley Data Base.
To arrive at a reasonable estimate of the actual SS EVA require-
ments, the data were further analysed as to mission firmness and
locations. It was arbitarily decided to include only those
missions which had firmness ratings in the data base of 1,2, and
3, and 20 percent of firmness rating 4. After also removing all
polar missions, the results were as depicted in Figure 2-2.
As indicated, 346 manhours of EVA time are estimated to be re-
quired in the first year of Space Station operation, increasing
to a maximum of 1512 manhours required in the seventh year of
Station operation. Two cautions go with these estimates. First,
these are only estimates, heavily dependent on guesswork about
missions as far as fifteen years in the future. Second, related
to the first caveat, a "tail-off" phenomenon exists after the
third year of Station operation, indicating that few experiment-
ers and payload sponsors wish to guess about events so far in
the future. This yields what is probably a false tail-off in
required EVA hours in the latter years covered by the estimates
and causes such estimates as exist to consist heavily of firmness
4 missions, yielding a further reduction due to our weighting
procedure.
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FIGURE 2-2
Estimated EVA Mi "-sslon Manhour Requirements for Space Station Core
It must also be pointed out that the experience of Skylab and
Shuttle indicates that unplanned EVA mission requirements tend to
exceed planned requirements by approximately 2 to 1 and for this
reason our mission model is thought to be extremely conservative.
Regardless of the amount of EVA determined by whatever means,
program managers will likely have to allocate EVA crew time as a
program resource, with limits determined by crew size, systems
design capabilities and overall program priorties. This allo-
cation may then determine which missions may be accommodated. The
Functional Requirements Envelope, promulgated by NASA in May 1985
estabilished an allocation of EVA time for users which very coin-
cidently approximated our user requirements model.
Space Station construction time estimates were also derived by
assigning times based on the Generic 15 Missions to construction
tasks and plans presented in the Space Station Reference Configu-
ration Description (JSC 19989) and to tasks and plans developed
by MDAC Phase B Space Station personnel for the dual-keel confi-
guration. While Station construction may have significant impacts
on Space Shuttle EVA support requirements, it does not seem to
drive Space Station EVAS requirements, except to the extent of
possibly driving the point at which the Station airlock is
brought up for assembly with the rest of the Station. Otherwise,
there is insufficient data to properly integrate SS construction
with the time phased SS EVA mission requirements.
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To complete the SS EVA mission model, an assessment of mainten-
ance requirements for the Station was required. With little cred-
ible data to support such an analysis, an extrapolation from on-
going Phase B studies was made. Various levels of maintanance
estimates were derived based on the number of EVA and IVA orbital
replaceable units (ORUs) and several values of Mean Time Between
Failures (MTBF) were used. An allocation of 1192 EVA manhours
per year was made, which resulted from the definition of one
manhour MMTR for a properly designed EVA ORU, and reflecting the
use of scheduled or planned EVA maintenance to enhance SS main-
tainability overall. It is important that continuing evaluations
be made of SS EVA requirements for maintanance as the systems
definition efforts Jroceed.
Total SS EVA missions requirements, then, are as shown in Figure
2-3. It shows that a minimum requirement of about 1400 manhours
per year in the neighborhood of IOC grows to a requirement for
approximately 2700 manhours per year at IOC + 6.
EVA REQUIREMENTS -- SS CORE (MDAC)
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FIGURE 2-3
Total EVA Missions Plus ORU Manhours
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2.2 ASSESS REQUIREMENTS AGAINST AN EXISTING DATA BASE
The Space Station EVAS requirements were compared on a task-by-
task basis with current Shuttle EVAS capabilities. The general
conclusion was that all requirements were well within the capabil-
lities of a suited crewmember to perform. That is, no specific
EVAS hardware requirements or capabilities were driven by the
information on missions and tasks which were obtained. When the
EVAS capabilities were considered in light of likely 90 day
mission models, two basic problem areas were identified.
First, EVA operational impacts to Shuttle flights could not be
tolerated on the Space Station. This was particularly true in
the case of three specific impacts. The frequent large pressure
changes in cabin atmosphere incurred as a normal part of Shuttle
EVA's could not be tolerated on the Station with its sensitive
scientific experiments. Similarly, all Station operations could
not be driven by EVA support requirements as they are on the
Shuttle. EVA must be a routine, minimum impact part of day-to-
day Station operations, not a special case requiring maximum
attention from all hands. Finally, the heavy task-specific pre-
launch training encountered in preparing Shuttle crews for EVA
tasks will not be possible for Station crewmembers. Too many
nominal and far too many contingency tasks are possible during
the course of a 90 day mission to specifically train for them on
the ground prior to flight. These operational impacts, then,
require different handling on Space Station than they did on
Shuttle.
The second major difficulty arising from considering the entire
EVA mission model instead of just individual tasks is the problem
of EVAS maintenance. Currently, all EVA equipment undergoes a
maintenance cycle after every flight. For most equipment this
involves an extensive tear-down, test, and component replacement
with subsequent reassembly and complicated test and certification
for re-flight. Such procedures are not possible on the Space
Station due to time, personnel, operational, and material limita-
tions. A stronger emphasis on maintainability in the design
philosophy is thus called for, leading to an EVAS which requires
very little maintenance per hour of operation, fails in a safe
manner when it does fail, and which can be easily and quickly
repaired or serviced when required.
The actual hardware impacts associated with these findings will
be discussed in depth in the detailed study report, but the above
considerations constitute the drivers for the requirements embod-
ied therein.
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2.3 ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
Partly as a result of the assessment of EVAS requirements against
an existing database of EVA experience and knowledge, and partly
as a result of a dedicated analysis effort based on the Generic
15 Missions and the various mission models, a list of approximat-
ely 120 pieces of EVA ancillary equipment was derived.
Two broad categories of equipment, Generic Equipment and Special
Equipment were included in the list. Generic Equipment would be
provided as a normal part of the EVAS in standard equipment/tool
kits, arranged most likely into a nominal tool kit and supplement-
ary kits. Special Equipment would be provided by individual pay-
load sponsors as required to service their particular payloads,
assuming that equipment from the generic kits would not suffice.
It should be noted that the ancillary equipment list currently
contains both off-the-shelf hardware and hardware requiring var-
ious amounts of development. Often a significant portion of
such hardware development consists solely of making an otherwise
off-the-shelf item compatible with EVA operations. As a general
guidelin_ in EVA operations design, it is desirable to minimize
new hardware development by avoiding the use of Special Equipment
and by maximizing the use of the Generic Equipment already pro-
vided. However, the primary emphasis should be on minimizing
all loose equipment (Generic or Special) by proper design of the
subject equipment's interface with the EVAS. For instance, use
of captured butterfly latches on access ports is much to be
preferred over the use of bolts or screws requiring wrenches or
screwdrivers. While wrenches and screwdrivers are very much off-
the-shelf equipment, the butterfly latch dispenses with all loose
equipment (insofar as it's own operation is concerned) and is
therefore better than bolts and screwsrequiring tools to operate
them.
2.4 DOD EVA REQUIREMENTS
DOD EVA requirements were coordinated through the USAF Space
Division in E1Segundo, California. The DOD identified no
mission specific EVA requirements, but instead, expressed twelve
"concerns" which must be addressed by the EVAS in order for it to
be usable on defense-related missions. Of these concerns eleven
were already included as considerations in this study. The
twelth concern - an expressed desire for a two minute EMU don/doff
capability - was not a requirement for the Space Station EVAS.
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o IMPROVED MOBILITY o SIZING
o MAINTAINABILITY o HEADS-UP DISPLAY
o RADIATION PROTECTION o MICROMETEOROID PROTECTION
o STATIC CHARGING HAZARD o COMFORT
o I lVffvtEDIATE EVA CAPABILITY o CONTINGENCY TRANSLATION AIDS
o CONTAMINATION CONTROL o RAPID DONNING/DOFFING
FIGURE 2-4
DOD EVA SYSTEMS ISSUES
CONCLUSIONS
The central conclusion of the mission requirement survey is that,
•Jhile mission data base detail is insufficient for accurate
determination of specific task requirements, all EVA mission
:'equirements can be described in terms of the Generic 15 EVA
Missions. Because of this, it is felt that the capability to
accomplish the 15 Generic EVA Missions is mandatory and should be
the focus of future work until such time as greater mission
specific detail is available.
A second key conclusion is that, while individual tasks can be
accomplished by any suited crewmember, the current Shuttle EVAS
would not be satisfactory when examined in the light of the
overall mission model. Current EVAS impacts on Shuttle opera-
tions could not be tolerated on the Space Station, both in the
area of EVA operations and in the area of EVAS servicing and
maintenance. Therefore, a much improved EVA System must be pro-
vided for the Space Station.
A final conclusion, based on the overall mission model, is that,
while a two man EVA crew will suffice for the first years of
Space Station operations, within four to six years of Station IOC
a four man EVA crew will be required.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The EVAS should be designed so that EVA time is crew limited,
not hardware limited.
2. The capability should be developed to perform all 15 Generic
Missions including development of all Generic Ancillary Equip-
ment.
3. The EVAS must be maintainable on-orbit with continuous
operations for 90 days on a 50% duty cycle as a minimum.
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4. All payload sponsors should be made familiar with the JSC
10615A document and be encouraged to to use it in their design
efforts. For time estimate purposes, they should be made fa-
miliar with the Generic 15 Missions.
5. All payload sponsors should be provided with a Generic Tool
Kit description and a Specialized Tool Kit description. They
should be encouraged to use a design requiring minimal loose
equipment with such equipment as required being chosen from the
Generic Tool Kit if possible. They should be encouraged to
identify any required specialized tools as quickly as possible.
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SECTION 3
TASK 2 - EVAS BASELINE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA
3.1 OPERATIONS
In order to develop realistic design requirements, a general
understanding of EVA operations is necessary. EVA by its very
nature provides the flexibility to change the way we operate in
space on a day-to-day basis, but certain functions are required
to be performed regardless. The key elements of any EVA
operation from a mature Space Station are:
3.1.1 PLANNING/SCHEDULING: EVA tasks to be performed are sched-
uled by the master crew scheduling system, along with any other
(IV) tasks to be performed for a particular day. Tasks are
prioritized according to criticality, proximity to one another,
launch windows, etc., then a group of tasks is selected to be
performed in the course of an EVA event. EVA is nominally sched-
uled to'be conducted during the 9 orbits/day which do not pass
through the South Atlantic Anomaly in the Van Allen radiation
belts. At least two crewmembers on each shift have been trained
to perform EVA, allowing mission planners maximum flexibility.
3.1.2 EVAS HARDWARE: Each EVA crewmember normally is assigned an
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) consisting of a Life Support
System and Crew Enclosure, and is responsible to insure that all
required checks have been performed on his unit prior to EVA,
whether manually or automatically. On-orbit resizing capability
is required in order to permit changes in crewmember/EMU assign-
ment, changes in sizing preference, and maintainability (modu-
larity) of the EMU crew enclosure joints, but resizing is not
normally accomplished on a routine basis. Four complete EMUs
(1/crewmember, 2 crewmembers/shift) will provide the flexibility
and redundancy needed to support the number of EVA hours predic-
ted.
3.1.3 TYPICAL SCENARIO
3.1.3.1 PRE-EVA: Donning of cooling garment and waste
collection device(s) is not discussed here; we have assumed that
this would take place in the crewmember's personal quarters, much
as a workman on earth decides when he gets up whether to wear
work clothes or a business suit for a particular day's
activities. The day's mission is reviewed among the crew and/or
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ground support personnel. Checks equivalent to preflight
inspection of an aircraft are performed on the EMU. These checks
consist primarily of confirmation of completion of servicing
(battery recharge, C02 media regeneration or replacement, heat
sink regeneration or recharge, and oxygen recharge), followed by
a visual inspection of the hardware. Each EMU has an associated
"logbook" in the Station Data Management System (DMS) which keeps
track of accumulated time on the EMU components as well as any
minor anomalies which do not preclude system operation, but may
possibly cause degraded performance of one or more subsystems.
This "logbook" is also reviewed as a part of the checks.
Functional checks are performed in conjunction with system
donning and activation, assuming no major maintenance has been
performed since the last use. If any of these checks reveal a
condition which cannot be corrected on the spot, the EVA is
postponed unless it is time-critical, in which case a spare EMU
is utilized for that particular EVA event, with the failed unit
being restored to an operational condition in one duty cycle or
less (approximately two days initially, one day or perhaps even
one shift as the tempo of operations picks up in later years).
3.1.3.2 EVA: The conduct of the EVA consists of some amount of
overhead--translation to worksite, trash stowage, etc.--and
performance of some combination of the generic EVA tasks/missions
identified in section 2 for a total time at reduced pressure up
to 7 hours, with up to 6 hours of that being dedicated to useful
EVA tasks. (An additional hour of reserve capacity isavailable
from the Life Support System, but this capability is not normally
used except in an emergency.) Translation requirements can be
satisfied by a number of approaches (hand-over-hand, propulsion,
"dumbwaiter" or trolley concepts, etc.); flexibility can be most
enhanced by not precluding any of these methods. For example, a
trolley is likely the most efficient means of translation along a
keel, while access to solar panels or the like for inspection,
and especially rendezvous with/retrieval of free-fliers will
require some sort of maneuvering propulsion. Upon arrival at the
worksite, restraint is required for the crewmember and for any
tools or other ancillary equipment in use. Permanent worksta-
tions will be provided in areas of intensive EVA activity, proba-
bly along with Station services such as power, hardline communi-
cations, and cooling. Some sort of portable, temporary worksta-
tion will be required which attaches to most any part of the
Station, probably to the truss structure, for use in areas which
do not have prepared worksites.
3.1.3.3 POST-EVA: After repressurization of the airlock and EMU
doffing, the crewmember initiates recharge and performs a visual
inspection of the EMU. The recharge systems located in the
airlock automatically shut off upon completion of the recharge.
Optionally, this recharge can be accomplished by module replace-
ment to enable rapid turnaround of the EVAS.
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3.1.4 EVA SYSTEMS AND TASK TRAINING
Considering the sheer number of EVA hours required annually and
the necessity of devising operational techniques and procedures
between infrequent Shuttle flights, the impact of extensive
mission-specific ground training associated with STS EVA clearly
cannot be tolerated for Station operations. The following
training philosophy is therefore recommended.
3.1.4.1 GENERIC TRAINING (ground): EVA crewmembers receive
training roughly equivalent to that provided for STS flights
without a planned EVA. This is currently broken into two
distinct areas:
o System operation fundamentals such as activation and
troubleshooting of the Primary Life Support Subsystem
(PLSS), donning/doffing of the Space Suit Assembly (SSA),
and activation, piloting techniques and troubleshooting of
the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU). Normal servicing and
maintenance tasks are taught as a logical outgrowth of this
training.
o Performance of certain identified contingency EVA tasks
required for safe return of the Orbiter after a given set of
failures. Corrective actions for these failures, however
credible, provide practice in the required basic skills such
as position maintenance, translation, teamwork, and tether
protocols, as well as familiarization with mobility
limitations associated with Pressure suits.
3.1.4.2 TASK SPECIFIC TRAINING: This training will be conducted
on-orbit, primarily by the use of OJT. Unusually complex tasks
may require special augmentation via video/CAI presentations, but
for the most part rely on an awareness of EVA considerations
during the design of the component/payload or during mission
planning to enable application of generic training to the
particular task.
3.1.4.3 RECURRENT TRAINING: Emergency procedures and system
refresher training will need to be conducted regularly in order
to insure maximum crewmember proficiency and safety. This is
partially a subset of task-specific training, in that rescue of
an incapacitated EVA crewmember, for instance, differs only in
criticality, not in task performance, from the translation of any
large object or module. System emergency procedures training
could best be accomplished by use of the EVAS DMS in concert with
the Station DMS to simulate various system failures.
3.1.5 EVA SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE
On-orbit maintenance of the EVAS is, for all practical purposes,
completely new ground for the U. S. space program. The
relatively short duration of missions to date, along with the
relatively small number of EVA hours required and the philosophy
that EVA is a backup to other methods of mission accomplishment,
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have relegated on-orbit maintainability to the status of an
unnecessary luxury, one that we could ill a.ford in an era of
decreasing NASA budgets. With the dependence expected to
rightfully be placed on EVA for mission accomplishment in the
Station environment, on-orbit maintainability ceases to be a
luxury and becomes instead an absolute necessity. Incorporation
of maintainability features in the EVAS at the outset not only
increases the probability of success for any payload exterior to
the pressurized compartments of the Station, but provides a
built-in capability to upgrade the system as will inevitably be
required after well-meaning (and in all likelihood, necessary)
budget cutting at the front end of the program forces acceptance
of a less than optimum initial configuration.
3.1.5.1 SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE: For STS, scheduled maintenance has
consisted of approximately 3000 hours of ground turnaround
between each mission. This will have to be reduced to no more
than annual refurbishment of systems, and ideally to repairing
only inoperative components. There is no apparent reason why the
hardware should not continue to operate indefinitely, just as
aircraft continue to provide reliable service after many years of
operation.
3.1.5.2 UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE: Provisions will have to be made
aboard the Station to troubleshoot the EVAS and to isolate
failures to the ORU level. Definition of this level is premature
at this point, as it is circularly dependent on system design,
which in turn depends on ORU level definition. This iterative
process is best accomplished during the preliminary design phase.
Considerations will include tool requirements for disassembly of
components, cleanliness requirements, crew training, and many
others. As a general rule, design of any system should not
preclude any subcomponent being designated as an ORU unless this
unnecessarily complicates design or increases cost (procurement
or operations).
3.1.5.3 MAINTENANCE DOCUMENTATION:
The Documentation System ("logbooks") has access terminals at all
maintenance locations (primarily the airlock).
The EVAS components (crew enclosure, life support system,
propulsion system, and support equipment) are subdivided into
ORUs, at which level all maintenance documentation will be
recorded.
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3.2 EVA SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS
The basic configuration of the EVAS is driven by the environment.
That is, any configuration developed will have to provide life
support services, environmental protection, and probably propul-
sion.
The configuration and system sizing are driven by operational
considerations. Due to the lack of detailed definition of
missions, we feel that the best approach is to try to maximize
the advantage from having a man present, which means enhancing
his flexibility at every opportunity. In doing this, several
overall EVAS issues come to light:
0 MAINTAINABILITY--The elements of maintainability (modularity
and accessibility) go further toward permitting design
flexibility than any other concept. That is, any ORU that
can be removed and replaced during maintenance can just as
easily be replaced by an uprated version for growth or a
less advanced system for fall-back in the event of technical
or funding problems in advancing technology.
0 SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION--Closely related to
maintainability, frequently competing. Should be minimized
in favor of maintainability. NOTE: This does not apply to
physical integration such as putting the radio in the
backpack, rather to such concepts as tying the humidity
control system to the feedwater system as in the STS EMU
PLSS. While this effectively minimized the PLSS volume as
required by STS considerations, it precludes upgrade of one
of these systems without a complete system redesign.
0 AUTONOMY--Every opportunity to provide autonomy of the
Station from the ground or the EVA crewmember from the
Station should be capitalized upon, thus providing a host of
operational (flexibility) benefits.
0 ACCEPTABLE PHYSIOLOGICAL RISK--Since so little is known
about the physiology of decompression sickness, we feel the
best approach is to not try to determine some boundary level
of denitrogenation, rather a cabin/suit pressure ratio
should be adopted which negates the need for prebreathe.
(According to current thinking, this means R = 1.22 or less,
where R is the ratio of alveolar nitrogen to the final suit
pressure.) For the sake of EVA productivity, this
combination should be as low as possible consistent with
fire hazards, experiments, etc. From an EVA standpoint, a
cabin pressure of 70 kPa (10.2 psi) with 30% 02, along with
an EVAS operating pressure of 40 kPa (5.8 psi) would seem to
be the optimum.
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u NOMINAL AND MAXIMUM LENGTH OF EVA--While longer EVA duration
capability means a larger LSS, the overhead associated with
getting outside on a "per event" basis dictates that the
system be sized according to practical upper size limits and
physiological (fatigue) considerations.
Different disciplines have a different view of this. From
an operational standpoint, we should provide 6 hours per
crewmember per day available to users. From an equipment
design standpoint, 8 total hours of life support available
including reserve. From a logistics standpoint, 3 two-man
EVA events per week.
0 REDUNDANCY--No single, credible failure should result in
the loss of a critical function (though it may possibly
result in function degradation and/or premature termination
of EVA).
In summary, the correct approach to defining design requirements
for a productive EVAS is to strive to provide the maximum
flexibility in order to enable future operations planners, design
engineers, and most of all EVA crewmembers to apply the
advantages of human presence with minimum restrictions. EVAS
requirements were developed based on this premise, and are
summarized in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.12. Discussions of
rationale for each requirement are contained in the detailed
study report.
3.2.1 LIFE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
The Life Support System (LSS) must provide the following
functions in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) space vacuum during
performance of tasks identified in Section 2.
0 PRESSURIZATION/PRESSURE CONTROL
0 ADJUSTABLE PRESSURE FROM 30-66 kPa (4.3-9.5 psi)
0 REDUNDANT REGULATORS
0 EMERGENCY MANUAL BACKUP
0 BREATHING OXYGEN--TOTAL 6 KG
0 6 HOURS OF USEFUL WORK @ 300 W (1000 BTU/HR) AVG
0 2 HOURS OF COMBINATION OVERHEAD/RESERVE @ 300 W
0 45 MIN OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS W/ 6 KG/HR LEAK
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3.2.1 LIFE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS (continued)
0 ATMOSPHERE REVITALIZATION
0 C02: SIMILAR TO SHUTTLE REQUIREMENTS--PERMIT HIGHER LEVEL
DURING HIGH METABOLIC ACTIVITY AND LATE IN EVA
0 HUMIDITY: 40-70% RELATIVE HUMIDITY_ MAX 90%
0 TRACE CONTAMINATES: IDENTICAL TO SHUTTLE REQUIREMENTS
0 THERMAL CONTROL--Collect, store_ and/or reject heat.
0 100-600 WATTS (340-2000 BTU/HR)
0 NO OVERHEATING BELOW 450 W
0 AUTO CONTROL DESIRABLE
3.2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
The EVA crewmember and EVAS must be protected from the
surrounding environment.
0 RADIATION
0 IONIZING
0 PROTON
0 MAINTAIN TOTAL MISSION DOSE @ ACCEPTABLE LEVELS
0 SCHEDULE ALL NON-EMERGENCY EVA AROUND SAA
0 RF
0 CONTROL OPERATIONALLY
0 NON-IONIZING: PROTECT EYES_ HELMET FROM UV
0 MECHANICAL DANGERS
0 MICROMETEOROIDS/SPACE DEBRIS > 95% PROB OF NO PUNCTURE
BASED ON DEBRIS MODEL
0 SHARP CORNER/EDGE SAME AS SHUTTLE SINCE STS EMU USED FOR
CONSTRUCTION
0 ATOMIC OXYGEN: CONTROL WITH MATERIALS SELECTION/SHIELDING
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3.2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS (continued)
0 STATIC CHARGING
0 CREWMEMBER: LEVELS DO NOT PRESENT A DIRECT THREAT
0 EVAS/PAYLOAD: PROPERLY GROUND, SHIELD ALL ELECTRONICS; USE
GROUND STRAP WHEN APPROACHING PAYLOADS
3.2.3 MOBILITY/ANTHROPOMETRIC SIZING REQUIREMENTS
Mobility considerations produce a requirement for an
anthropomorphic crew enclosure with maximum torque and minimum
joint range equivalent to a Shuttle EMU at 30 kPa (4.3 psi).
Range of crew size to be accommodated should be specified so as to
fit the largest possible percentage of the target population with
the minimum number of components. Attempts to fit an arbitrarily
defined range of male and female percentiles for STS resulted in
a system which cost far too much, compromised fit for all but a
few_ and ultimately failed to fit the specified range due to the
technology limitations of building gloves for the small end of
the anthropometric range while retaining sufficient mobility to
allow the crewmember to perform useful tasks.
3.2.4 COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS
0 ALL RF LINKS REQUIRE ENCRYPTION CAPABILITY
0 VOICE
0 FULL DUPLEX BETWEEN ALL PARTIES AT ALL TIMES
0 DESELECTION OF STATIONS ON NET CAPABILITY FOR EVA
CREWMEMBERS
0 CONSIDERED SUBSET OF DATA COMMUNICATIONS SINCE DIGITAL
SYSTEM IS ANTICIPATED
0 DATA
0 SS --> EVAS
0 RELATIVE STATE VECTOR (1/SECOND) DURING UNTETHERED
OPERATIONS
0 PROCEDURAL TEXT AND GRAPHICS (1 SCREEN/5 SECONDS)
0 EVAS --> SS
0 COMPLETE SYSTEM STATUS (1/SECOND)
0 CONTINUOUS CARRIER ("KEEP-ALIVE")
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3.2.4 COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS (continued)
0 VIDEO
0 NOMINAL ATTACHED OPS COVERED BY STATION CCTV SYSTEM
0 STATION --> EVAS
0 ONE SCREEN/5 SECONDS
0 HARDLINE CONNECTOR ON EVAS (FULL MOTION FROM
STATION, PREVIEW CAMERA TRANSMISSIONS)
0 EVAS --> STATION
0 FULL-MOTION REQUIRED DURING EEU FREE FLIGHT
3.2.5 DATA MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS
0 I/O DATA HANDLING FUNCTION
0 PROVIDE INTERFACES TO EVA CREWMEMBER, EVAS DISPLAY,
EVAS SYSTEMS, EVAS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
0 VALIDATE RECEIVED DATA ACCORDING TO CRITICALITY
0 SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT FUNCTION
0 SAMPLE ALL BIO, EMU, EEU INSTRUMENTATION, DISTRIBUTE
DATA
0 DETERMINE HEALTH, MISSION STATUS, ISSUE C & W
0 MANAGE DISPLAYS (SOURCE, TYPE)
0 EEU GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
0 APPLICATIONS PROGRAMS
0 FIRMWARE REQUIRED FOR SAFETY-CRITICAL FUNCTIONS
0 STANDARDS/SPECS SIMILAR AS POSSIBLE TO THOSE FOR SS
INTERGRATED DMS
0 STANDARDIZED CREWMEMBER INTERFACE
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3.2.6 MANEUVERING PROPULSIONREQUIREMENTS
0 MMU-CLASS VEHICLE (EEU) REQUIRED FOR CREWMEMBER RESCUE
SCENARIO, HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR ROUTINE MISSION OPERATIONS
0 REMAINDER OF REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPED ASSUMING EEU WOULD BE
DEVELOPED AND BUILT
0 OMV-CLASS VEHICLE (TUG) HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR LARGE OBJECT
MANIPULATION
0 COLD GASEOUS NITROGEN FOR PROPELLANT EXCEPT FOR REMOTE
TUG OPS
0 50 M/SEC (150 FT/SEC) DELTA-V REQUIRED FOR EEU
0 SAME ACCELERATION (TRANSLATIONAL AND ROTATIONAL) AS
SHUTTLE MMU
0 REDUNDANT PROPULSION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS AS ON SHUTTLE
MMU
0 NAVIGATION/TARGETING INFORMATION FOR RENDEZVOUS W/ CEP
< 10 M AT < 2 KM
0 AAH CAPABILITY W/ SELECTABLE INHIBIT OF UP TO 2 AXES
0 SELECTABLE CG OFFSET COMPENSATION
0 ATTACHMENT PROVISIONS FOR ROBOTIC/TELEOPERATOR CONTROL
0 UNIVERSAL GRAPPLE FIXTURE
0 CREWMEMBER RESCUE INTERFACE FOR CREWMEMBER W/ OR W/O
EEU
0 VARIABLE THRUSTER SELECT LOGIC TO MINIMIZE PLUME
IMPINGEMENT
0 AUTO SERVICING W/ MINIMUM CREWMEMBER INTERVENTION
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3.2.7 CREWMEMBER SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
0 HAND-IN CAPABILITY HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO ENHANCE ALL FUNCTIONS
0 750 CALORIES OF FOOD FOR EVA CONSUMPTION
0 1.2 LITERS (40 OZ) OF WATER FOR EVA CONSUMPTION
0 WASTE MANAGEMENT
0 HYGIENICALLY COLLECT 1.5 LITERS (510Z) OF URINE
0 FECAL/VOMITUS CONTROL NOMINALLY ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH
DIET AND PERSONAL HABITS
3.2.8 MAINTENANCE/MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENTS
0 MODULAR DESIGN W/ EASY ACCESS, QUICK DISCONNECTS FOR FLUID
AND ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS
0 MINIMIZE REQUIREMENT FOR PERIODIC MAINTENANCE AND
TESTING--MAINTAIN ON CONDITION
0 FAIL-SAFE DESIGN ALLOWING SAFE RETURN TO A PRESSURIZED
ENVIRONMENT AFTER COMPONENT FAILURE
0 IV MAINTENANCE WORKSTATION WITH APPROPRIATE
RESTRAINT/POSITION AIDS AND FLUID, ELECTRICAL, AND
ELECTRONIC INTERFACES
0 EVA MAINTENANCE STAND FOR EEU, INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR
PROPELLANT VENTING IN THE EVENT THE EEU OR SOME COMPONENT
THEREOF MUST BE BROUGHT INSIDE
3.2.9 SERVICING REQUIREMENTS
0 ROUTINE SERVICING AUTOMATED TO MAXIMUM EXTENT PRACTICAL
0 IF REGENERATIVE LSS SYSTEMS USED, IN-PLACE REGENERATION
IS DESIRABLE
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3.2.10 LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS
0 SUFFICIENT CONSUMABLES AND SPARE PARTS FOR 120 DAYS W/ THREE
TWO-MAN EIGHT-HOUR EVAs/WEEK
0 STORAGE CAPABILITY FOR ONE YEAR'S SUPPLY OF EEU PROPELLANT
HIGHLY DESIRABLE
0 MINIMIZE QUANTITIES OF SPARE PARTS REQUIRED THROUGH USE OF
RUGGED_ HIGH-RELIABILITY PARTS
0 MINIMIZE REQUIREMENT FOR TOOLS (ESPECIALLY UNIQUE TOOLS)
3.2.11 OPERATIONAL LIFE REQUIREMENTS
0 MINIMUM ONE YEAR ON-ORBIT BETWEEN GROUND RESERVICING
0 MINIMIZING COMPONENT MASS SHOULD BE SECONDARY TO SIMPLICITY
AND RUGGEDNESS
0 OPERATIONAL CYCLES SHOULD BE MINIMIZED (E.G._ CHECKOUT IN
CONJUNCTION W/ NORMAL DONNING AND ACTIVATION)
3.2.12 EXTERNAL CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS
0 ANTHROPOMORPHIC CREW ENCLOSURE
0 EMU SIZED FOR 95th PERCENTILE CREWMEMBER SHALL PASS THROUGH
SHUTTLE AIRLOCK HATCH
0 EEU SHALL ACCOMMODATE CREWMEMBER IN SHUTTLE EMU
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SECTION 4
TASK 1 - SPACE STATION/EVA SYSTEM INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS AND
EVA ACCOMMODATIONS
The Space Station/EVAS interface requirements fall into eight
different categories:
1. Atmosphere Composition/Pressure
2. Communications
3. Data Management
4. Logistics
5. Safe Haven
6. SS Exterior Requirements
7. SS Interior Requirements
8. SS Airlock
4.1 ATMOSPHERE COMPOSITION AND PRESSURE
Several issues impact the choice of Station cabin atmosphere and
pressure. EMU pressure should be as low as possible to provide
the least productivity impact due to glove and suit joint
mobility impairment or to pre-breathe requirements. Feasible maximum
suit pressures drive feasible maximum cabin pressures because of
the necessity for denitrogenation as the delta between the two
increases. Figure 4-1 illustrates the relationship between EMU and
cabin pressure with the area inside the lines defining possible
combinations of pressures based on various assumptions. The
parameter R is defined as the ratio of partial pressure of
nitrogen in the crewqmember's tissues to final (EMU) pressure.
Note that zero pre-breathe is assumed, which means that_
according to current medical research_ an R of 1.22 and no higher
is desired to prevent an occurance of bends. The glove
mobility limit line indicates the highest pressure at which
current technology provides reasonable glove mobility.
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Based on this analysis, a Station cabin pressure of 10.2 psi would
be recommended, which together with an R value of 1.22 and a suit
pressure of 6 psi would give acceptable EVAS performance with no
pre-breathe. However, the Phase B programmatic decision has been
made, due to other, global, Space Station considerations, to set
cabin atmospere at 14.7 psi Earth normal. This shifts all
impacts, then, to the EVAS, pushing us beyond current glove
technology for high pressure mobility or beyond acceptable bends
risk without denitrogenation.
As Figure 4-1 indicates, due to the 14.7 psi cabin atmosphere
either a high technological risk is incurred by requiring a suit
Rressure of 9.5 psi (with no pre-breathe), or productivity
impacts are generated by requiring pre-breathe to achieve the
lower suit pressure. The option of higher R values on a regular
basis is not recommended due to increased crewmember risk of
bends. The possible requirement for pre-breathe could force an
impact on the Space Station by generating a further requirement
for an intermediate pressure in the EVA prep area.
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CABIN/EMU PRESS FOR ZERO P/B
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4.2 COMMUNICATIONS
Three types of communication are desired to support EVA
operations. They are:
1. Full Duplex Voice Communications
2. Data Uplink/Downlink
3. Video Uplink/Downlink
where uplink/downlink refers to Station to EVAS communications.
Full duplex voice communications would have to be provided for up
to four EVA crewmembers simultaneously with the added provision
to allow different teams of crew members, both IV and EV, to carry
on separate conversations without interference from the other
team.
Data uplink/downlink would consist of communication of system
status data, alarms, and crew health data and possibly navigation
information for a free-flying crewmember. Note that information
would travel both ways, from Station to EVAS and vice-versa.
Video communications would provide freeze frame television to the
EV crewmembers for transmission of procedural/task aids, and full
motion television from the crewmember to the Station for
worksite/task data to the Station and ground.
All issues associated with the Communications interface are
straightforward design issues such as selection of the method of
navigation of a free-flyer or degree of integration of the EVAS
communications system with the station communications system. A
list of all issues is presented in Figure 4-2.
1. FULL INTERGRATION OF EVAS COMM. WITH STATION COMM.
2. DIRECTIONALITY OF SIGNAL
3. POWER REQUIREMENTS
4. COMPATIBILITY WITH SHUTTLE
5. MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
6. METHOD OF NAVIGATION
FIGURE 4-2
EVA/SS COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES
119
4.3 DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The Space Station/EVAS Data Management System (DMS) would be
responsible for all data handling and for the associated data
systems management. The EVAS and associated EVAS DMS should
appear to the Station DMS as merely another user with, possibly,
some peculiar Input/Output requirements.
The DMS would be responsible for input/output data handling,
interfacing the Station and EVAS processors to the full duplex
telemetry system.
The DMS would be responsible for monitoring it's own systems
and would also be responsible for monitoring EVA systems,
providing EVAS monitoring and control (including alarms and
procedures), free-flyer navigation and targeting information, and
general displays management. The DMS could act as residence for
an EVA monitor expert system.
Issues associated with the DMS are questions of allocation of
functions to the EVAS or Station DMS, and questions of allocation
of functions to software or firmware.
4.4 LOGISTICS
Upon analysis, five general EVA logistics requirements categories
were discovered. These are:
1. Scheduled Maintenance Items
2. Regenerable EVAS ORUs to Support Quick Turnaround
3. Single Use and/or Low MTBF Items
4. Select Damage Prone Items
5. Select Random Failure Items
These group into two classes of resupply items:
I. On-Board Spares - One Time Delivery, Replenish as
Required
2. Resupply Items - Resupply Every 90 Days
After determining initial quantities of EVAS items from
operational considerations and the mission model, spares and
resupply cycle data were derived from STS experience and
extrapolations from technlogy development programs. Tables such
as Table 4-1 were derived for each major EVAS end-item and overall
logistics requirements were determined as shown in Table 4-2.
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ON-ORBIT EMU SPARES - One time delivery; replenish as required
ITEM QUANTITY MASS kg (Ibm) VOL. liters (Ft3)
EMULSS 2 378 (834) 382 (13.5)
SCU 2 10 (22) 57 (2.0)
Phase ChangeHeat 2 20 (43) 28 (1.0)
Exchanger
CO2 Removal Canister 2 98 (216)
CWS
TABLE 4-1
PROJECTED EMU SPARES REQUIREMENTS
MASS (KG) VOL (LITERS)
ON ORBIT EMU SPARES 520 555
Resupply as required
EMU RESUPPLY90 DAYS 414.5 537
ON ORBITSERVICEEQUIPMENTSPARES 47.2 46.9
Resupply as required
SERVICEEQUIPMENTRESUPPLY 0.3 6
EEU SPARES 190.6 125.1
Resupply as required
ANCILLARYEQUIPMENTSPARES 54.1 361.6
TABLE 4-2
LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
Logistics issues stem from the uncertainty currently present in
all EVAS designs. ORU definition is configuration dependent and
actual MTBFs will drive sparing provisions, as will the
maintenance philosopy adopted and implemented. Additionally, all
EVAS use models, especially the EEU use model, are fairly soft.
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4.5 EVA SAFETY HAVEN
The EVA Safety Haven would have two practical uses:
1. As a shielded refuge from harmful radiation environments
2. As a pressurized refuge in cases of EVA crew emergency at
a remote worksite requiring rapid pressurization
Two basic radiation threats present themselves to the EVA
crewmember at LEO: the South Atlantic Anomaly in the Van Allen
belts and sudden intense solar flares. The South Atlantic Anomaly
is a downward bulge of the Van Allen belts towards the
surface of the earth which subjects any unshielded crewmember
passing through it to higher than normal radiation fluxes. Over
a period of 90 days_ the expected average crew stay timer these
exposures could add up to harmful levels. While a safe haven
could be used to shield the EVA crew member for the 15 minutes of
a pass through the Anomaly, the problem can be avoided entirely
simply by scheduling the EVA to coincide with orbits which miss
the SAA. This means that the EVA crew shift would have to be
changed_ say from first to second shifty as orbital precession
moved SAA passes into EVA periods. This is preferred to use of a
safety haven.
Sudden intense solar flares could also pose a threat to the EVA
crew. While an EVA safety haven could be used to protect them_ in
all cases sufficient warning of the arrival of a flare (at least
8 minutes) should exist to allow the crew to return to the
Station interior and seek shelter there. This latter approach is
preferred. Such events are not expected to occur more than once or
twice in the eleven year solar cycle.
The EVA safety haven could be used to provide a pressurizable
volume at a remote worksite in case of some emergency requiring
rapid pressurization. Such an emergency might be a large leak in
the EMU pressure garment or extreme in3ury or illness of the
crewmember requiring immediate attention. The safety haven would
need to be transportable in this case_ both to be emplaceable
next to the current worksite and to allow its transportation to
the Station airlock once used. The safety haven would need to
interface with the Station airlock to allow transfer of the
affected crewmember in a pressurized environment to the Station
interior. While this capability is desirable, it is not justified
as a requirement and the decision to implement it will have to be
made by weighing probability of need versus the cost of
implementation.
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4.6 SPACE STATION EXTERIOR
The Space Station exterior architecture must provide for:
1. Access to Worksites
2. Compatible and Efficient Workstations
3. Stowage of EVA Tools and Equipment
4. Remote Dependent Life Support Capablity
5. Crewmember Safety
Access to worksites is provided by translation aids and
restraints. Two types of translation aids, handrails and
supplemental aids, are required. Handrails should be provided at
all points on the Station exterior to allow manual translation by
EVA crewmembers. Exceptions are locations where Station primary
structure provides sufficient handholds for such translation.
A supplemental aid or aids should be provided to allow rapid
crewmember translation over long distances on the Station. Such
aids would perform the functions of an elevator or dumbwaiter and
would allow the crewmember to move quickly about the Station
exterior either unencumbered or while carrying cargo equivalent
to a medium module (up to 250 kg. and/or 1 cubic meter). A second
type of supplemental aid would also be required, this one to move
large modules from point to point on the Station in approximately
20 minutes or less.
Exterior restraints would be required comprising tether points
and workstations. Tether points could either be fixed, probably
an integral part of each handhold, or mobile, either as the
working end of a safety line or slidewire or as part of a
supplemental translation aid.
Workstations can either be fixed or mobile, that is, transferrable
from worksite to worksite. They should not only firmly restrain
the crewmember during work, but should also firmly hold the piece
being worked on and any tools and parts required as well.
Sufficient lighting should be provided the crewember on the
Station exterior and at worksites (workstations) to allow
unimpaired task performance during both day and night cycles. A
tentative minimum of 50 foot-candle area lighting should be
provided with the capability to perform 200 foot-candles of spot
lighting.
External Stowage is required to permit convenient access to
tools, equipment and ORUs, etc., while EVA.
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A Dependent Life Support System (umbilical) may be required to
provide support for a limited dapability EMU Life Support
Subsystem, to allow extension of a critical EVA, or to provide
closed-cycle operation in the vicinity of sensitive
instrumentation.
Safety of EVA crewmembers must be provided for on the Station
exterior first by providing standards for exterior equipment
design and second by the provision of required safety equipment.
In the first case, a design criteria document similar to JSC
10615A "EVA Description and Design Criteria" should be provided
for the Space Station to guide Station and payload designe.-s with
proper design standards. In the second case, an autonomous
capability to retrieve stranded free-floating crewmembers (and
debris) must be provided.
NUMBER AND TYPE OF AUXILLIARY TRANSLATION AIDS
OPERATIONAL SPECIFICATIONS: CARGO MASS, TRANSLATION TIMES,
ACCESS DESIGN CONCEPTS/SPECIFICATIONS
NUMBER AND TYPE OF WORKSTATIONS
FIXED AND PORTABLE
LOCATIONS
SITTING OF STOWAGE FACILITIES
OPTIMAL LOCATION
NEED FOR UMBILICAL
SOFT REQUIREMENTS VS COST
SAFETY DESIGN STANDARDS
WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS?
DESIGN CONCEPTS FOR STRANDED CREWMEMBER RESCUE
FREE-FLYER VS SELF-CONTAINED
FIGURE 4-3
SPACE STATION EXTERIOR ISSUES FOR EVA ACCOMMODATIONS
As shown in Figure 4-3, most issues associated with Space Station
exterior interface requirements are design issues. Two exceptions
exist. The need for a Dependent Life Support System is soft and
may not justify the cost. And stranded crew member rescue might
possibly be acomplished by some method other than by a free-
flying maneuvering unit, at a much smaller cost, but the free-
flying unit is the only method in which confidence currently
exists.
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4.7 SPACE STATION INTERIOR
Space Station interior EVA interfaces must provide:
1. Stowage for EMUs, Support Equipment and Spares
2. An EVA Preparation Area
3. An EVA Servicing, Maintenance and Checkout Area
4. An EVA Planning/Training Area
Examination of various impacts and considerations allows
allocation of the four functions above to Station modules.
The impacts and considerations are:
1. Volume Required
2. Utilities and Systems Interfaces Required
3. Proximity of Related Functions
The functions, then, are allocated as shown in Table 4-3.
STOWAGE PREP/POST SERVICING MAINT. CHECKOUT PLANNING
AIRLOCK/EVAMODULEPREFERRED MANDATORYIMANDATORYPREFERREDMANDATORY OPTION
HABMODULE OPTION OPTION PREFERRED
LOGMODULE OPTION(SPARES)
TABLE 4-3
ALLOCATION OF INTERIOR REQUIREMENTS TO AREAS
The Airlock/EVA module is the only logical location which
satisfies EVA requirements in that it minimizes volume impacts to
other SS modules and integrates operational requirements with
utilities and system interface locations. However, some assembly,
sub-assembly or component maintenance tasks may require a
specialized maintenance environment depending on actual ORU
definition, trouble shooting and post maintenance test
requirements and cleanliness requirements. This might take the
form of a "cleanroom" - like area in a Hab module.
4.8 SPACE STATION AIRLOCK
The primary function of the Station airlock is to provide a safe,
efficient means of transfering men and equipment to and from the
vacuum of space without imposing any adverse effects on Station
operations. As noted above, it must also have provisions for
storage of EVA equipment and must provide EVA system servicing
and maintenance equipment including automatic servicing and
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checkout equipment. It i s  h i g h l y  des i rab le  t o  minimize t he  amount 
o f  gas l o s t  w i t h  each cyc le  t o  vacuum. Therefore a i r l o c k  
depressurized volume should be kept t o  a minimum and as much 
atmosphere as poss ib le  and cos t -e f f ec t i ve  should be re ta i ned  and 
recycled. 
A programatic requirement f o r  a hyperbaric chamber has a l so  been 
l e v i e d  w i t h  t he  a i r l o c k  being t he  p re fe r red  l o c a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  
chamber. It must accommodate two crewmen and such medical 
equipment as requ i red  dur ing  hyperbaric treatment, as we l l  as 
spec i f i ed  biomedical moni tor ing apparatus. It must be capable o f  
operat ion a t  s i x  atmospheres f o r  two hours, t he rea f t e r  f o l l ow ing  
a standard Navy decompression p r o f i l e  back t o  cabin atmosphere. 
SECTION 5
SUMMARY
5.1 STUDY OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED
As they were defined by the Statement of Work, our study objec-
tives were achieved by survey and research, analyses and trade
studies. We have developed what we consider to be a comprehen-
sive set of design requirements for the Space Station EVAS and
its interfacing and supporting systems.
In addition to the study contract objectives, the McDonnell-
Douglas team had several other objectives in mind. First, we
were determined to assist NASA in justifying a productive EVA
capability for the Space Station program. As adamant EVA advo-
cates we were strongly motivated to see that EVA and its attend-
ant systems and accommodations received the programmatic atten-
tion they deserved. Secondly, we were fresh from our experiences
in developing and conducting the STS EVA missions and eager to
apply the lessons learned to the Space Station development effort.
We were confident that as a continuing part of the NASA-led SS
development team, we would share in the downstream benefits of a
strong front end effort. Finally, and taking our cue from a theme
consistent throughout the SOW, we wanted to make sure that all EVA
system definition and development efforts were sensitive to human
productivity aspects and impacts which are so often expressed in
non-quantifiable terms.
Our first objective was shown to have been naively conceived as
our mission requirements survey resulted in an EVA mission model
which demands EVA services on a sustained and routine basis.
Even with peak needs exceeding 3000 manhours in a year, the model
must be considered conservative_ since the SS maintenance, ser-
vicing, and repair requirements are poorly defined at this time
and there is virtually no data to support the unplanned or con-
tingency requirements which have been responsible for so much of
the STS recent EVA requirements. We must continue to recognize
that our mission model, as well as those we are aware of being
utilized in SS Phase B trade studies, are indeed conservative and
may not represent the full scope of EVA requirements for the
Space Station.
Throughout the study we were careful to apply the lessons learned
from the STS EVA experience base to our analyses and trade stud-
ies and found this background useful in identifying truly useful
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advancements, in weighting trade-off criteria or in assessing all 
the ramifications of a new requirement or concept. Extrapolating 
from this base also enabled us to characterize the key differ- 
ences in EVA capabilities and limitations between the STS and the 
SS. While we feel we were thus successful in meeting our second 
objective we recognize that there is a continuing need for NASA 
and the Space Station contractors to pursue this goal in the 
development of EVA systems. 
With regards to the emphasis placed on human productivity aspects 
of EVA designs, we made a concerted effort to bias our trades in 
favor of productivity, even to the point of ignoring development 
cost as a discriminator between design options. So far, our 
conviction that maximizing the use of 'the crew as the most criti- 
cal SS resource was the highest priority is being borne out by 
the EVAS cost trades being performed in the Phase B arena. We 
will have a continuing concern, though, that there will be pro- 
ductivity impacts resulting from priorities established for dis- 
tributing limited SS development funds and minimizing those im- 
pacts will be a major challenge to the program. The savings in 
operational costs will be the future dividend of that effort. 
5.2 AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER STUDY 
Phase B studies will continue to refine EVAS requirements during 
the SS preliminary design phase, and both contractor and NASA 
Advanced Development programs will continue to develop the neces- 
sary technologies. We strongly recommend that emphasis be placed 
in the following areas as the program advances (Figure 5-11. 
5.2.1 KEY ISSUES 
The SS program has already recognized the importance of the 
radiation exposure issue as it affects the SS as a whole. We 
feel that this is the proper perspective to take considering the 
frequency, duration, and dose rate of the possible crew expos- 
ures, both IV and EV. 
So long as space suit mobility remains affected by suit pressure, 
we must look for ways to improve the technology or lower the suit 
pressure. This is especially true for the gloves where even a 
technology breakthrough would be enhanced even further by lower- 
ing the operating pressure. However difficult it is to measure 
the impacts of this problem on overall EVA productivity, we are 
convinced that it will significantly affect the productive util- 
ization of EVA as a valuable program resource. 
While we are convinced that a maneuvering propulsion capability 
should be a part of the advanced EVAS, we recognize that the 
justification for it is not as firmly rooted in mission require- 
ments as are the justifications for other systems. The cost of 
providing this capability should be carefully balanced against 
